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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article briefly examines the case law of the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court in the field of freedom of religion with respect to the 
legal status of churches and religious groups as well as the protection 
of individual freedom of conscience. Due to the limited space avail-
able, this study focuses only on the Court’s most significant deci-
sions.1 
My goal is to provide an overview of the main issues concerning 
religious liberty that have come to the jurisdiction of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court and analyze the way in which the Court has 
applied constitutional principles. This analysis will reveal some defi-
ciencies that can be—and must be—corrected, especially with regard 
to the individual aspects of freedom of conscience. As we will see, on 
the whole, the Court’s approach to these issues does not differ much 
from the one taken by the European Court of Human Rights, which 
acts as a sort of Constitutional Court, interpreting the freedoms in-
cluded in the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. 
Part II of this article describes briefly the historical antecedents of 
the current Spanish constitutional treatment of religious freedom. 
Part III outlines the fundamental principles that undergird Spanish 
law regarding religious issues, i.e., the “ecclesiastical law of the 
State.”2 Part IV subsequently examines the Court’s case law regard-
 
 1. For an analysis of the Spanish Constitutional Court’s decisions through 1991, see 
RAFAEL RODRÍGUEZ CHACÓN, EL FACTOR RELIGIOSO ANTE EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 
[THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] (1992), and ANDRÉS 
ÁLVAREZ CORTINA, EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO ESPAÑOL EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA 
POSTCONSTITUCIONAL, 1978–1990 [SPANISH ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN POSTCONSTITU-
TIONAL JURISPRUDENCE] (1991). Interesting materials on specific aspects of Spanish constitu-
tional jurisprudence can be found in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y DE CONCIENCIA ANTE LA 
JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL: ACTAS DEL VIII CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHO 
ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO [FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE BEFORE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ACTS OF THE VIII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF STATE 
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW] (Javier Martínez-Torrón ed., 1998) [hereinafter FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE]. 
 2. The term “ecclesiastical law of the State” (“derecho eclesiástico del Estado”) was de-
rived from the Italian diritto ecclesiastico, which in turn comes from the German Staatskirchen-
recht. Most Spanish scholars share the idea that the term’s meaning currently lacks precision, as 
the legal and scholarly approach to these issues has evolved from church-state relations to the 
regulation of freedom of religion and conscience. For an extensive treatment of this issue, see 
generally JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, RELIGIÓN, DERECHO Y SOCIEDAD: ANTIGUOS Y 
NUEVOS PLANTEAMIENTOS EN EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO [RELIGION, LAW AND 
SOCIETY: ANCIENT AND NEW APPROACHES IN STATE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW] (1999), and the 
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ing the basic legal position of churches, including the Catholic 
Church, non-Catholic churches, and new religious movements. Part 
IV focuses on the manner in which the Court’s decisions affect the 
protection of the individual’s freedom of conscience. Finally, Part V 
provides several conclusory observations. 
As an introductory remark, it may be useful to note that the 
Spanish Constitutional Court’s structure and function is very differ-
ent from the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, the Spanish Court most 
closely resembles the German and Italian Constitutional Courts, 
which served as models and sources of guidance for the Spanish 
Court.3 
In Spain, the Constitutional Court is the only court entitled to 
declare a law unconstitutional.4 The Court can do this by deciding a 
motion of unconstitutionality (recurso de inconstitucionalidad) or a 
question of unconstitutionality (cuestión de inconstitucionalidad). 
The former involves an examination of the constitutionality of a stat-
ute in abstracto, i.e., independently from its application to a particu-
lar case, and can be filed by the government, the Spanish Ombuds-
man (Defensor del Pueblo), fifty congressmen or senators, and some 
collegial bodies of Spain’s autonomous regional communities. The 
latter can be submitted by any Spanish court that considers that a 
statute applicable to a particular controversy may be unconstitu-
tional. An ordinary court cannot itself declare a statute unconstitu-
tional, but can propose its opinion on the issue in the form of a 
“question” and ask the Constitutional Court to decide the issue. 
In addition, the Constitutional Court decides motions of protec-
tion (recursos de amparo), i.e., petitions filed by individual or legal 
persons that believe that their constitutional rights and freedoms 
have been violated. Aggrieved parties may file such petitions after 
 
bibliography cited therein. In the last years there have been some attempts to change the term 
“derecho eclesiástico del Estado”, and the notion itself of this legal discipline. See especially DI-
ONISIO LLAMAZARES, DERECHO DE LA LIBERTAD DE CONCIENCIA [THE LAW OF FREEDOM 
OF CONSCIENCE], vol. I, 11–24 (1997); and JOSÉ A. SOUTO, COMUNIDAD POLÍTICA Y 
LIBERTAD DE CREENCIAS [POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND FREEDOM OF BELIEF] 11–34 (1999). 
 3. See EDGAR CORZO SOZA, LA CUESTIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD [THE 
QUESTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY] 157–208 (1998). 
 4. See C.E. arts. 161–63 (Spain), translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS 
AFFAIRS 25, 39–40 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa María Martínez de Codes eds., 1998) [herein-
after SPANISH LEGISLATION]. This legislation, and other relevant information, is available on 
the web page of the General Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Justice: 
<http://www.mju.es/mreligiosos.htm> (visited Mar. 24, 2001). 
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having exhausted the judicial remedies available before the ordinary 
courts. The majority of Constitutional Court decisions resolve recur-
sos de amparo. This is true also with regard to the general issue of re-
ligious freedom, although some interesting issues on religion have 
been decided through the other two channels. 
Finally, those readers who belong to common law systems 
should bear in mind that case law is only a part of the law—and not 
the most important part—in a civil law system like Spain. This fact 
applies to the case law of the Constitutional Court as well, notwith-
standing the Court’s significance as the supreme oracle of the Span-
ish Constitution. Church-state relations and religious freedom are 
matters that are strongly regulated by statutory law and by-laws, as 
well as by formal agreements between the state and the most influen-
tial religious communities. 
II. SOME HISTORICAL REMARKS 
Spain’s current Constitution was enacted in 1978, three years af-
ter General Franco died and Spain’s political transition to democracy 
began.5 This is the first Spanish Constitution that has provided an 
adequate solution to the social and political conflicts that religious 
ideas have traditionally caused in Spain. 
The reason for its success is that the Constitution of 1978 effec-
tuated a gradual transformation of the Spanish confessional state into 
a regime based on religious freedom without breaking abruptly with 
the nation’s historical tradition. Spain had been a confessional state 
since it became a unified kingdom in the late fifteenth century; the 
state officially professed Catholicism, and there existed an inseparable 
nexus between Catholicism and Spain’s national identity.6 The state’s 
 
 5. See generally Gloria M. Morán, The Spanish System of Church and State, 1995 BYU 
L. REV. 535, 537 (discussing the “period of political transition from 1975 to 1978 [that] 
culminated in the 1978 Constitution”). 
 6. It is usually assumed that the Spanish kingdom began in 1492 when Queen Isabel of 
Castille and King Ferdinand of Aragon, who married in 1469, conquered the Moorish king-
dom of Granada. Significantly, Ferdinand and Isabel are known as the “Catholic Kings” 
(“Reyes Católicos”) because the spreading and strengthening of Catholicism allegedly formed 
one of their main goals in politics, both within the territory of the Spanish peninsula as well as 
in the subsequent colonization of America. In any event, the adjective “Catholic” is actually 
better applied to Queen Elizabeth; King Ferdinand has been often presented as one of the ar-
chetypal examples of Machiavellian Renaissance princes. Ferdinand and Isabel’s two most dra-
matic decisions involving religious issues involved the expulsion of Jews and Muslims in 1492 
and 1502, respectively. Faithful members of these two religions had to either convert to Ca-
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public endorsement of the Catholic faith was usually accompanied by 
intolerance of other religions with an intensity that varied according 
to the political and religious circumstances. 
For almost five hundred years, the Catholic confessionality of the 
Spanish state experienced only two ephemeral interruptions: the 
Constitution of 1869 (derogated in 1876) and the Republican Con-
stitution of 1931.7 Indeed, the gravest mistake of the Constitution of 
1931—Spain’s last democratic Constitution prior to 1978—was its 
hostile attitude towards the Catholic Church. The Republican Con-
stitution proclaimed the general principle of freedom of religion and 
conscience, but, in an attempt to diminish the Catholic Church’s ex-
tensive influence on the country’s national political and cultural life, 
it imposed severe restrictions on the actual freedom of ecclesiastical 
institutions.8 These restrictive provisions, together with their devel-
 
tholicism, the “true religion,” or leave the kingdom. This religious policy was continued by 
succeeding kings. Philip II, for instance, promulgated in 1564, as “laws of the kingdom,” the 
decrees of the Council of Trent, historically known as the Counter-Reformation Council. Even 
the Constitution that introduced the spirit and doctrines of liberalism into Spain, the 1812 
Constitution of Cádiz, began with an invocation to “Almighty God, Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit” (author’s translation), and enshrined the Catholic religion as part of the political struc-
ture of the Spanish state with the following words: “The religion of the Spanish Nation is, and 
will perpetually be, the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman religion, which is the only true one. The 
Nation protects it by wise and just laws, and prohibits the exercise of any other religion” (art. 
12, author’s translation). For a succinct and interesting synopsis of the history of church-state 
relationships in Spain during the last three centuries, with abundant bibliographical references, 
see Pedro Lombardía, Precedentes del derecho eclesiástico español [Precedents of Spanish Ecclesias-
tical Law], in DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL [ECCLESIASTICAL LAW OF THE 
SPANISH STATE] 111 (2d ed. 1983); see also JOSÉ M. CUENCA TORIBIO, RELACIONES 
IGLESIA-ESTADO EN LA ESPAÑA CONTEMPORÁNEA: 1833–1985 [CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN: 1833–1985] (1985) (regarding the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies). 
 7. The Constitution of 1869, Article 21, recognized the state’s obligation to support 
the Catholic Church without establishing Catholicism as the state religion. Article 3 of the 
Constitution of 1931 provided that “[t]he Spanish state has no official religion” (author’s 
translation). 
 8. Article 27 of the Republican Constitution provided: “Freedom of conscience and 
the right to freely profess and practice any religion are guaranteed within the Spanish territory, 
with the exceptions derived from the due respect to public morals” (author’s translation). 
However, the same Article subjected all cemeteries to the state’s authority and forbade the es-
tablishment of separate religious sections within state cemeteries; only private worship was 
permitted (public acts of worship were subject to a specific authorization by government). In 
any event, the very heart of the problem was Article 26. According to the different provisions 
of this Article, all financial aid to the Catholic Church was suppressed, including tax benefits 
for religious corporations (it should be noted that the state’s economic support was a sort of 
compensation for the massive confiscation of ecclesiastical property in 19th century). All relig-
ions were considered as “associations subjected to a special law.” The Order of Jesuits was dis-
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opment by statutory law and the strongly anti-clerical attitude of 
some of the Republican governments, largely provoked the social 
and political convulsions that ended tragically in the Spanish Civil 
War (1936–1939) and led to General Franco’s dictatorship (1939–
1975).9 
As previously indicated, the Constitution of 1978 renounced 
Catholic confessionality and explicitly declared that the Spanish state 
has no official religion.10 State neutrality does not mean that religion 
must be ignored or that the state adopts a sort of “secular confes-
sionality.”11 On the contrary, Article 14 prohibits discrimination 
based on religious grounds. Freedom of religion and belief, as well as 
cooperation with churches, defines state policy on religious affairs. 
Significantly, Article 16(3) specifically requires the state to cooperate 
 
solved, and all other religious orders and congregations were subjected to different legal con-
trols and restrictions, in particular with regard to their capacity to acquire and administer prop-
erty. In addition, they were prohibited from engaging in teaching activities; this provision was 
particularly severe and certainly unrealistic, considering that most schools in Spain were in the 
hands of the Catholic Church. 
 9. On the religious policy of the Second Republic, see generally Javier Martínez-
Torrón, Derecho de asociación y confesiones religiosas en la Constitución de 1931 [The Right of Asso-
ciation and Religious Faiths in the Constitution of 1931], 3 CUESTIONES CONSTITUCIONALES 
[CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES] 91 (2000), and the bibliography cited therein. For an analysis of the 
religious policy of General Franco’s regime, see Alberto de la Hera, Las relaciones entre la Iglesia y el 
Estado en España (1953–1974) [Church-State Relationships in Spain: 1953–1974], 211 REVISTA DE 
ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS 5 (1977). 
 10. The Constitution primarily deals with religion in Articles 16 (freedom of ideology, 
religion and worship) and 14 (principle of equality). Article 16 states: 
1. Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individual and communities is 
guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression than may be necessary to 
maintain public order as protected by law. 
2. Nobody may be compelled to make statements regarding his religion, beliefs or 
ideology. 
3. There shall be no State religion. The public authorities shall take the religious be-
liefs of Spanish society into account and shall in consequence maintain appropriate 
co-operation with the Catholic Church and the other confessions. 
Similarly, Article 14 provides that “Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way 
be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other condition 
or personal or social circumstance.” (Both Articles are translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, 
supra note 4.) Other provisions of the Constitution that directly or indirectly relate to freedom 
of religion and belief include Article 30 (conscientious objection to military service), Article 27 
(right to education and freedom of teaching), Article 20 (freedom of expression), and Article 
22 (freedom of association). 
 11. See generally María J. Roca, La neutralidad del Estado: fundamento doctrinal y de-
limitación en la jurisprudencia [State Neutrality: Doctrinal Foundations and Definition in Ju-
risprudence], in IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO [ECCLESIASTICAL LAW] 405 (1997). 
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with the Catholic Church12 and other religious denominations ac-
cording to their relevance in the Spanish society. Although statutes 
and by-laws enacted after the Constitution have created different 
channels for state cooperation with churches, the main instruments 
of this cooperation are the Concordat with the Catholic Church and 
parallel agreements with other religious denominations of particular 
social significance.13 
 
 12. In the years after the Constitution was enacted, Spanish scholars widely discussed 
the potential legal effects of the specific mention of the Catholic Church by Article 16(3). See, 
e.g., Pedro-Juan Viladrich, Los principios informadores del derecho eclesiástico español [Informa-
tive Principles of Spanish Ecclesiastical Law], in ECCLESIASTICAL LAW OF THE SPANISH STATE, 
supra note 6, 231–36. However, the passage of time has demonstrated that the mens legisla-
toris in that Article did not seem to go beyond what could be described as a “tranquilizing ef-
fect.” In brief, the new regime of relationships between the state and religion implied a deep 
change in Spanish tradition. The drafters of the Constitution did not want the Catholic hierar-
chy to think that they were following the example of the Constitution of 1931, in which, as 
indicated above, a sort of vendetta against ecclesiastical institutions replaced the Catholic con-
fessionality of the state. Including the name of the Catholic Church in Article 16(3) helped to 
avoid the risk of a negative reaction on the part of the most conservative religious circles in 
Spain, and contributed to eliminate possible attacks against the extraordinary political change 
that was taking place in Spain, which some influent social forces of Catholic pedigree regarded 
with diffidence. It explains an apparent paradox stemming from the support of the Communist 
Party—which traditionally had been, and was in 1978, an anticlerical party—for Article 16(3)’s 
reference to the Catholic Church. For a description of the parliamentary debates on Article 16, 
see J. JAVIER AMORÓS, LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE 1978 
[RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION OF 1978] 120–53 (1984) . 
 13. The establishment of cooperative agreements between the state and non-Catholic 
religious denominations constituted an innovative addition to the Spanish legal tradition, and 
was inspired by the Italian Constitution, which in turn was inspired by German law. In Spain, 
these agreements were created in abstracto by Article 7 of the Organic Law of Religious Free-
dom (Ley Orgánica 7/1980, July 5, 1980, translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra note 
4), which allows the government to negotiate cooperative agreements with religious denomi-
nations of particular social significance and requires that such agreements be approved by a 
specific act of Parliament. The new institution was put into practice for the first time (and, at 
the moment, also for the last time) in 1992, when Parliament approved three agreements with 
the Evangelical Churches, the Jewish communities, and the Islamic communities, all of which 
are very similar in content. In the following years, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“LDS Church”) have endeavored to reach an agreement with 
the state; however, it presently does not appear that negotiations between these groups and the 
government will successfully conclude in the near future. For an analysis of the 1992 agree-
ments in the context of Spanish constitutional principles and in light of comparative law, see 
generally JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, SEPARATISMO Y COOPERACIÓN EN LOS ACUERDOS DEL 
ESTADO CON LAS MINORÍAS RELIGIOSAS [SEPARATISM AND COOPERATION IN STATE 
AGREEMENTS WITH MINORITY RELIGIONS] (1994). See also David García-Pardo, El contenido 
de los acuerdos previstos en el artículo 7.1 de la ley orgánica de libertad religiosa [The Content of 
the Agreements Provided for in Article 7(1) of the Organic Law of Religious Liberty], in 16 
ANUARIO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO [A.D.E.E.] 223 (2000). 
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SPANISH LAW ON 
RELIGIOUS ISSUES 
A. Four Fundamental Principles 
Spanish scholars agree that four constitutional principles consti-
tute the fundamentals of Spanish law on religious affairs.14 These in-
forming principles (principios informadores) are religious freedom, 
equality, neutrality, and cooperation. While no strict hierarchical or-
der governs the relationship between these principles, they collec-
tively establish a system of coordinates that define the plane of con-
stitutional legitimacy to which legislator and government must limit 
their activity.15 
The principle of religious freedom gives coherence to the other 
three, for it defines the objective to be attained by the state. This 
principle means that the state must guarantee adequate protection of 
all individuals’ and groups’ right to freedom of religion and con-
science. The equality of citizens before the law demands that no one 
can be subjected to discrimination on the basis of religion or beliefs. 
Equality, in turn, stems from the principle of neutrality, which for-
bids the state from evaluating the different religions according to 
their doctrines or tenets—the state may only judge their social ef-
fects. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 has enshrined the principle 
of state neutrality, instead of the prior principle of confessionality, for 
it is viewed as essential to guarantee the equal protection of religious 
 
 14. See generally JOAQUÍN CALVO ÁLVAREZ, LOS PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO 
ECLESIÁSTICO ESPAÑOL EN LAS SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL [PRINCIPLES 
OF SPANISH ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN THE CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] 
(1999). The initial and most influential analysis of these principles was written by Pedro J. 
Viladrich, Los principios informadores del Derecho eclesiástico español [Informative Principles of 
Spanish Ecclesiastical Law], in DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL 
[ECCLESIASTICAL LAW OF THE SPANISH STATE] 245 (1st ed. 1980). For an English-language 
overview of the Spanish law on religious affairs, see Iván C. Ibán, State and Church in Spain, in 
STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 93 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1996), and Morán, 
supra note 5, at 535–53. Until now, the most extensive treatise on the subject, written in Spanish, 
is the collective volume TRATADO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO [TREATISE OF ECCLESIASTICAL 
LAW OF THE STATE] (1994). 
 15. See Javier Ferrer Ortiz, Los principios constitucionales del derecho eclesiástico como sis-
tema [Constitutional Principles of Ecclesiastical Law as a System], in LAS RELACIONES ENTRE LA 
IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO: ESTUDIOS EN MEMORIA DE PEDRO LOMBARDÍA [RELATIONS BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE: STUDIES IN MEMORY OF PEDRO LOMARDÍA] 309 (1989) [hereinafter 
RELATIONS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE]. 
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freedom of all citizens. Finally, the principle of cooperation prevents 
neutrality from imposing a separation between church and state. Co-
operation thus provides the basis for diversified state collaboration 
with religious denominations on condition that the other princi-
ples—especially neutrality and equality—are duly respected. State 
cooperation with churches, which is required by the Constitution, 
implies that religion is considered a positive reality in Spain as far as 
it is a natural effect of the exercise of a fundamental freedom. 
B. The Constitutional Court and the Four Fundamental Principles 
Since its establishment, the Spanish Constitutional Court sub-
stantially accepted the prior description of the principles that govern 
state law on religious affairs.16 
In 1982, the Court affirmed: 
[T]here are two basic principles in our political system which de-
termine the state’s attitude towards religious phenomena and the 
entire order of relationships between state and churches or religious 
denominations: the first is religious freedom, understood as a fun-
damental right which consists in the acknowledgment of an envi-
ronment of freedom and a sphere of agere licere of individuals; the 
second is equality, . . . according to which it is not possible to es-
tablish any kind of discrimination or diverse legal treatment of citi-
zens on account of their ideology or beliefs, and there must exist an 
equal enjoyment of religious freedom by all citizens.17 
The same decision also endorsed the principle of state neutrality 
with the following words: “[the neutrality principle] prevents . . . re-
ligious values or interests from standing as parameters to measure the 
 
 16. See Javier Ferrer Ortiz, Los principios informadores del derecho eclesiástico del Estado 
[Informative Principles of State Ecclesiastical Law], in FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND 
CONSCIENCE, supra note 1, at 107; José A. Souto, Libertad ideológica y religiosa en la juris-
prudencia constitucional [Freedom of Ideology and Religion in Constitutional Jurisprudence], in 
RELATIONS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 15, at 511, 520–27. 
 17. STC 24/1982, May 13, 1982, FJ 1 [“fundamento jurídico,” i.e., statement as to 
the law] (author’s translation). The case considered the constitutional legitimacy of the Spanish 
system of Catholic religious assistance to the military. For scholarly commentary on this deci-
sion, see JOSÉ M. CONTRERAS, EL RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LA ASISTENCIA RELIGIOSA EN LAS 
FUERZAS ARMADAS EN EL SISTEMA ESPAÑOL [THE LEGAL REGIME OF RELIGIOUS ASSISTANCE 
IN THE ARMED FORCES UNDER THE SPANISH SYSTEM] 518–40 (1989), and Lourdes Babé, La 
asistencia religiosa a las Fuerzas Armadas ante la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional 
español [Religious Assistance to the Armed Forces Before the Case Law of the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court], in FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE, supra note 1, at 351. 
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legitimacy or justice of the laws and of the activity of public authori-
ties. At the same time, [it] bans any sort of confusion between state 
and religious functions.”18 Later that same year, the Court empha-
sized the significance of state cooperation with churches.19 
Naturally, the Court’s application of these four fundamental 
principles to actual cases has been sometimes problematic. While 
some of these problems involve the compatibility of the principles of 
equality and cooperation with the legal position of the Catholic 
Church,20 others relate to the Court’s interpretation of the neutrality 
principle. Consider the following three Constitutional Court cases. 
1. Religious symbolism in a public university 
The first decision,21 issued by the Court in 1991, concerned the 
use of religious symbols by public institutions. The Constitutional 
Court declared that a state university could legitimately remove the 
image of the Virgin Mary from its official coat of arms if the govern-
ing bodies of the university considered such action to be appropriate 
in light of the state neutrality in religious matters. However, the 
Court noted that the constitutional principle of neutrality did not 
obligate the university to remove the image, because respect of his-
tory and tradition might have persuaded the university authorities to 
maintain those religious symbols traditionally included in the univer-
sity’s heraldic emblem. 
More specifically, the facts of the case were the following. The 
Senate of the University of Valencia had decided to remove the im-
age of the Virgin Mary from its official coat of arms. A group of pro-
fessors and students challenged the resolution and obtained an af-
firmative judgment from the ordinary courts. The Constitutional 
Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and held that the univer-
 
 18. STC 24/1982, May 13, 1982, FJ 1 (author’s translation). The Court had previously 
discussed state neutrality, together with religious freedom, in a 1981 decision, stating: “[I]n a 
legal and political system founded on pluralism, the individuals’ freedom of religion and ideol-
ogy, and the aconfessionality of the state, all public institutions, and in particular education 
centers, have to be indeed ideologically neutral.” STC 5/1981, Feb. 13, 1981, FJ 9 (author’s 
translation). 
 19. See STC 66/1982, Nov. 12, 1982 (involving the recognition of civil effect to an 
ecclesiastical court’s decision declaring the nullity of a canonical marriage). Other Constitu-
tional Court cases that emphasize the significance of church-state cooperation include STC 
93/1983, Nov. 8, 1983, FJ 5 and STC 265/1988, Dec. 22, 1988, FJ 4-5. 
 20. See infra Part IV.A. 
 21. STC 130/1991, June 6, 1991. 
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sity’s governing bodies were free to modify the emblems represent-
ing the university. The Court affirmed that while respect for history 
certainly formed an important and legitimate criterion for decision in 
this matter, it was not the only one. Indeed, the Court acknowl-
edged that the university’s senate had implicitly followed a different 
and equally legitimate criterion, namely, the idea “that a University 
emblem without elements of religious significance is more adequate 
to the logic of a non-confessional State that an emblem with 
them.”22 The Court held that, in any event, the university, as a pub-
lic corporation endowed with autonomy, was free to decide the is-
sue. Moreover, the Court indicated that, when engaged in such in-
quiries, the courts must limit their examination to verifying that 
decisions made by public institutions are both legal and not irra-
tional, arbitrary, or absurd. 
Although the Court did not provide more specific criteria on this 
particular point, in my view, the reference to history is important. In 
a religiously neutral state, the legitimate use of religious symbols in 
public institutions must occur in connection with the history of the 
institution—or the history of the country—which often has ancient 
religious roots. The religious symbol thus becomes “secularized” as a 
way to preserve a link with tradition. If this type of historical justifi-
cation does not exist, the use of religious signs in public institutions 
should be considered unconstitutional because such use would pub-
licly transmit a religious message. A religiously neutral state would 
thereby create a new tradition of a religious nature, resulting in a 
“confusion between state and religious functions.”23 
2. Religious ceremony in the armed forces 
This sort of confusion seems to be present in a 1996 case con-
cerning the participation of the armed forces in a religious cere-
mony.24 Following an old tradition, the military garrison of Valencia 
had organized a solemn military parade in honor of the Virgin Mary 
to celebrate the fifth centennial of the local patron saint, the Virgen 
 
 22. Id. at FJ 5 (author’s translation). 
 23. STC, May 13, 1982, FJ 1. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 24. STC 177/1996, Nov. 11, 1996. For a critical analysis of this decision, see Isidoro 
Martín Sánchez, Celebración por las Fuerzas Armadas de festividades religiosas y principio de 
laicidad [The Celebration of Religious Festivities by the Armed Forces and the Principle of Laic-
ity], in FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE, supra note 1, at 657. 
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de los Desamparados, who had received the honorific title of Supreme 
General of the Army in 1810. A sergeant in the garrison refused to 
participate in the ceremony for reasons of conscience and, following 
regular procedures, requested permission to not attend the event. Al-
though his superiors did not grant his request, the officer left the pa-
rade at the moment when the Virgin was honored. His commanders 
subsequently punished him with thirty days of home arrest and initi-
ated disciplinary proceedings against him with the aim of imposing 
further sanctions. 
In deciding the case, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed that 
participation in religious ceremonies is voluntary,25 a principle recog-
nized implicitly in Article 16(2) of the Constitution26 and explicitly 
in Article 2 of the 1980 Organic Law of Religious Freedom.27 How-
ever, the Court did not object to the fact that the army organized an 
official religious ceremony. On the contrary, after recalling its previ-
ous doctrine on state neutrality, the Court justified the army’s con-
duct with enigmatic and contradictory reasoning. Thus, after having 
referred to the military parades as “acts of unequivocal religious con-
tent, convoked and organized by the military authorities,” the Court 
added: “therefore [such parades] were not acts of religious nature in 
which the military participated, but military acts aimed to the cele-
bration of a religious festivity by military personnel.” Most surpris-
ingly, the Court further stated that “Article 16(3) of the Spanish 
Constitution does not prevent the armed forces from celebrating re-
ligious festivities or from participating in ceremonies of that na-
ture.”28 
The Court’s interpretation of the neutrality principle in the 
above case suffers from more than one significant flaw. It is true that 
 
 25. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Court did not rule in favor of the plaintiff 
due to some procedural complexities of the case that are not worth explaining here. In short, 
the Court did not consider that the unjust sanctions applied to the officer by his superiors 
could be qualified as criminal behavior. 
 26. Freedom of worship enshrined in Article 16(1) naturally implies freedom not to 
worship. See art. 16, supra note 10 (reprinting the provision in full). 
 27. Article 2(1)(b) of the Organic Law of Religious Freedom provides: “1. The freedom 
of worship and religion guaranteed by the Constitution secures the right, which may therefore 
be exercised by all without duress, to: . . . b) . . . be free from any obligation to receive spiritual 
support or participate in religious services that are contrary to their personal convictions.” 
(translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 41). 
 28. All the literal quotations in this paragraph are taken from STC 177/1996, Nov. 11, 
1996, FJ 10 (author’s translation). 
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the Court recognized the sergeant’s freedom of worship—which ob-
viously includes the freedom not to worship—but failed to realize 
the fact that, particularly with respect to principles, historical tradi-
tions cannot justify every state action. Constitutional principles, of 
course, permit, and even require, state practices aimed at facilitating 
the exercise of religious freedom by military personnel.29 Such state 
action, however, differs significantly from the army’s conduct in be-
coming involved institutionally in the organization of religious cere-
monies or services. Though this latter practice may be a matter of 
tradition, it seems less compatible with the principle of state neutral-
ity than does, for example, a university’s simple maintenance of an 
aesthetically significant religious symbol that evokes the institution’s 
ancient origin in a period when most European universities were 
founded by the Catholic Church. 
3. Land use privileges for churches 
The Constitutional Court proposed a more accurate interpreta-
tion of the neutrality principle in a 1993 case30 that struck down a 
provision of a 1964 statute granting the Catholic Church a privi-
leged position with regard to the renting of city houses. Historically, 
the renting of city houses was tightly regulated in Spain, as in many 
other European countries.31 Under the statute (Ley de Arrendamien-
tos Urbanos), in cases of “mandatory prorogation,” a tenant had the 
right to extend its lease unless the landlord could prove that he or 
she needed the house for his personal use or for the use of a close 
and dependent relative. However, the law conferred special privileges 
on certain institutions in their capacity as landlords. In particular, the 
law exempted the Catholic Church, along with public institutions 
and agencies, from having to prove that they needed “to occupy 
their own property to establish their offices or services.”32 It must be 
noted that the statute at issue was enacted when Catholicism was still 
 
 29. Thus, Article 2(3) of the 1980 Organic Law of Religious Freedom provides: “To 
ensure true and effective application of these rights, public authorities shall adopt the necessary 
measures to facilitate assistance at religious services in public, military, hospital, community and 
penitentiary establishments and any others under its aegis, as well as religious training in public 
schools.” 
 30. STC 340/1993, Nov. 16, 1993. 
 31. The matter continues to be subject to strict state regulation, though such regulation 
has been increasingly liberalized. 
 32. Art. 76(1) of the 1964 Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos (author’s translation). 
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the official religion of the Spanish state and the Concordat of 1953 
was in force. 
The Court declared unconstitutional the section of the 1964 
statute that granted a special privilege to the Catholic Church and 
put the ecclesiastical institutions on equal terms with so-called “pub-
lic law corporations.” The Court based its decision on the fact that 
the privileged legal status of the Catholic Church differed substan-
tially from the legal treatment granted to other physical and legal 
persons, including non-Catholic religious organizations. The Court 
concluded that such favorable treatment was not grounded on a rea-
sonable and proportionate justification. The ecclesiastical privilege 
was logical in the context of a confessional state, but not in a state 
which had specifically rejected the establishment of an official relig-
ion and adopted neutrality towards religion as one of its basic princi-
ples.33 
Significantly, a new statute enacted in 1994 replaced the 1964 
law, reducing the time of “mandatory prorogation” of the contract34 
and abolishing the privileges previously bestowed upon public insti-
tutions. This latter aspect had been proposed in a dissenting opinion 
in the 1993 case.35 
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CHURCHES 
The constitutional principle of cooperation naturally plays a sig-
nificant role in the definition of the legal status of churches in Spain. 
The fundamental provisions determining the legal position of 
churches and religious communities are found in the Organic Law of 
Religious Freedom.36 Article 7 of the Organic Law created a specific 
channel through which state cooperation could materialize: formal 
agreements between the state and churches.37 Introduced into Span-
 
 33. See STC 340/1993, Nov. 16, 1993, FJ 4. 
 34. The mandatory prorogation has been now reduced to the first five years of the con-
tract (under the preceding law its time was unlimited). 
 35. See the dissenting opinion of Justice José Gabaldón. 
 36. See Organic Law, arts. 4–8, translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 
41, 43–48. These four Articles comprise the second half of the statute. The first half is cen-
tered on the individual dimension of religious freedom. 
 37. Article 7(1) provides: “The State, taking account of the religious beliefs existing in 
Spanish society, shall establish, as appropriate, Co-operation Agreements or Conventions with 
the Churches, Faiths or religious Communities enrolled in the Registry where warranted by 
their notorious influence in Spanish society, due to their domain or number of followers. Such 
Agreements shall, in any case, be subject to approval [by] an Act of Parliament” (translated in 
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ish law with the aim of establishing a non-Catholic equivalent of the 
concordats with the Catholic Church, these cooperation agreements 
have extended some of the traditional benefits granted to the Catho-
lic Church to other religions of social significance. 
When Spain’s political transition to democracy began, it did not 
seem desirable—or even possible—to eliminate the bilateral relation-
ships between the Catholic Church and the Spanish state that were 
traditionally developed through concordats with the Holy See. 
Hence, the principles of equality and neutrality recommended the 
development of an analogous institution available to those non-
Catholic religious confessions that had acquired “well-known roots” 
in Spanish society.38 The nature of these cooperation agreements has 
been largely discussed by scholars who hold opposing views in some 
aspects but have the same opinion (almost unanimously) on two 
points.39 First, the cooperation agreements created by the Organic 
Law differ from concordats in that they are not considered equiva-
lent to international treaties. Second, these agreements do not con-
stitute by themselves a new source of law in the Spanish system, for 
they only acquire binding force if approved by a specific act of Par-
liament (Cortes).40 
Until now, as stated above,41 the Spanish state concluded three 
cooperation agreements with three federations of Evangelical 
churches, Jewish communities, and Islamic communities, respec-
tively, in 1992. The consequence is that these three federations, 
along with the Catholic Church, have been granted a specific legal 
status, which is substantially more favorable than the legal situation 
of the other religions regulated by ordinary state laws and by-laws. 
This fact raises diverse questions with regard to the interpretation of 
the equality principle. At the moment, the Constitutional Court has 
not decided any case related to the privileges of those non-Catholic 
religions included in the current system of cooperation agreements. 
On the contrary, the Court has decided a number of cases in which 
the special status of the Catholic Church was at issue. In the follow-
 
SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 41, 44). The word “notorious” is a literal translation 
of the Spanish “notorio.” It must be noted that this word in Spanish does not have the pejora-
tive meaning that it usually has in English. 
 38. See MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 13, at 20–30. 
 39. See id. at 95–116. 
 40. See Organic Law of Religious Freedom, art. 7(1), supra note 37. 
 41. See supra note 13. 
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ing sections, I will mention the most significant ones (section A) to-
gether with some other recent decisions referring to the legal posi-
tion of new religious movements (section B). 
A. The Catholic Church and the Equality Principle 
Concordats with the Holy See have a long history in Spain42 and 
have been recognized as having a nature similar to international trea-
ties.43 During General Franco’s regime, a concordat signed in 1953 
governed the state’s relationship with the Catholic Church.44 In 
1979, a set of four agreements—which, in fact, collectively constitute 
a concordat—replaced the Concordat of 1953. 45 The declared pur-
pose of the new concordat was to preserve, in harmony with the 
principle of cooperation, the Catholic Church’s legal privileges that 
were deemed compatible with the rest of the principles enshrined in 
the newly promulgated Constitution. 
However, this theoretical purpose encountered some obvious 
 
 42. For a summary of the history of bilateral relationships between the Spanish State and 
the Catholic Church, see Lombardía, supra note 6, at 111–28, and the bibliography cited 
therein. 
 43. On the equal nature of concordats and international treaties, see the classic book by 
HENRY WAGNON, CORCORDATS ET DROIT INTERNATIONAL [CONCORDATS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] (1935). See also Rafael Navarro-Valls, Convergencia concordataria e 
internacionalista en el ‘accord-normatif’ [Convergence of Concordat Law and International Law 
in the ‘accord-normatif’], 5 IUS CANONICUM 141 (1965). 
 44. The Concordat of 1953 replaced the Concordat of 1851, which was considered not 
in force from the beginning of the Second Republic, because its provisions were repeatedly 
infringed by the Constitution of 1931 and subsequent legislation and political praxis on reli-
gious affairs. A previous concordat had been signed in 1753. There were some attempts to ne-
gotiate a new concordat during the years of the Second Republic, but inflexibility on both 
sides made it impossible. See generally JOSÉ M. VÁZQUEZ GARCÍA-PEÑUELA, EL INTENTO 
CONCORDATARIO DE LA SEGUNDA REPÚBLICA [THE ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE A 
CONCORDAT DURING THE SECOND REPUBLIC] (1999). 
 45. See generally JUAN FORNÉS, EL NUEVO SISTEMA CONCORDATARIO ESPAÑOL [THE 
NEW SPANISH CONCORDAT] (1980). The four agreements signed in 1979 are: the Agreement 
on Legal Affairs (Agreement of January 3, 1979, between the Spanish State and the Holy See con-
cerning legal affairs), the Agreement on Economic Affairs (Agreement of January 3, 1979, be-
tween the Spanish State and the Holy See, concerning economic affairs), the Agreement on Edu-
cation and Cultural Affairs (Agreement of January 3, 1979, between the Spanish State and the 
Holy See, concerning educational and cultural affairs), and the Agreement on Religious Assis-
tance to the Armed Forces, and on the Military Service of Clergymen and Members of Reli-
gious Orders (Agreement of January 3, 1979, between the Spanish State and the Holy See, con-
cerning religious assistance of the Armed Forces and the military service of clergymen and members 
of religious orders). The text of the four agreements is translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, su-
pra note 4, at 51–69. 
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problems. The Concordat of 1979 had been negotiated before the 
definitive text of the Constitution was completed, and was signed 
just a few days after the Constitution was enacted.46 Spain did not 
yet have any tradition of religious freedom (nor of most civil liber-
ties), and neither the courts nor scholars had begun to develop an 
interpretation of the new principles governing church-state relations. 
As the signing of the Concordat of 1979 occurred so close in time to 
the promulgation of the Constitution, it remained very difficult—
perhaps impossible—to appreciate the exact magnitude of the consti-
tutional principles concerning religious freedom and the deep change 
that they were bound to produce in Spanish law.47 This fact may ex-
plain why some of the provisions of the Concordat have been a 
source of continued political tension.48 
1. Civil effect of canonical marriage 
One of the most typical and traditional expressions of state coop-
eration with the Catholic Church involves the granting of civil effect 
to the canon law on marriage. Under the Concordat of 197949 and 
the Civil Code as modified in 1981,50 marriages celebrated according 
to canon law have full civil effect once they are duly recorded in the 
civil registry. 
In general, however, the Church enjoys fewer marriage-related 
privileges than in the past.51 Contrary to previous practices, Church 
 
 46. The Spanish Constitution was promulgated on December 27, 1978, and the agree-
ments with the Holy See were signed on January 3, 1979. 
 47. See Pedro Lombardía, El concepto actual de Derecho eclesiástico y su marco constitu-
cional [The Present Concept of Ecclesiastical Law and its Constitutional Framework], 1 A.D.E.E. 
623, 648 (1985). 
 48. For instance, the provisions regarding the teaching of Catholic religion in public 
schools, civil effects of canonical marriage, Catholic religious assistance to the army, or state’s 
financial support to the Catholic Church. 
 49. See Agreement on Legal Affairs, art. VI, translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra 
note 4, at 51. 
 50. See C.C. [“Código Civil”], arts. 59–60. 
 51. Prior to 1978, the marriage of Catholics was left completely in the hands of the 
Church. Under the Civil Code and the Concordat of 1953, canonical marriage not only was 
granted civil effect, but it was the only valid form of marriage that people baptized in the 
Catholic Church could celebrate. Civil marriage was available only to non-Catholics and 
Catholics who had declared, in a formal statement, that they did not profess the Catholic relig-
ion anymore. Divorce was not available for either canonical or civil marriages. Only the Church 
courts had jurisdiction to judge the nullity of a marriage celebrated according to canon law, 
and their decisions were immediately executable by the civil courts. For a description of the 
historical evolution of the Spanish matrimonial system, see MARIANO LÓPEZ ALARCÓN & 
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courts no longer have exclusive jurisdiction over canonical marriages. 
However, these courts’ decisions pronouncing the nullity of a mar-
riage, as well as the pontifical dissolution of unconsummated mar-
riages, do have civil effect once they have been declared executable 
by the state courts, which enjoy a certain amount of discretion on 
the issue and follow a procedure analogous to that governing the ex-
equatur of foreign judicial decisions.52 In any event, as in the Italian 
system, the precise features of the Spanish matrimonial system are 
complex and have caused frequent jurisdictional conflicts between 
civil and ecclesiastical courts.53 
The Constitutional Court has decided a number of claims con-
cerning canonical marriage, most of which have related to technicali-
ties of the Spanish matrimonial system outside the scope of this arti-
cle.54 It is significant that the Constitutional Court has never 
questioned the constitutionality of the privileged treatment enjoyed 
by canonical marriage under Spanish law, even though such privi-
leged treatment leaves non-Catholic religious marriages in a mark-
edly inferior legal position. Since 1992, the form of celebration of 
Jewish, Evangelical, and Islamic marriages has been given civil effect, 
but the marital decisions of Jewish and Islamic religious courts have 
not received any civil effect at all.55 Moreover, Spanish law presently 
 
RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS, CURSO DE DERECHO MATRIMONIAL CANÓNICO Y CONCORDADO 
[COURSE OF MARRIAGE LAW ACCORDING TO CANON LAW AND THE CONCORDAT BETWEEN 
SPAIN AND THE HOLY SEE] 37–41 (5th ed. 1994). 
 52. Article 778 of the new Code of Civil Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil), 
which went into effect on January 8, 2001, increased judges’ discretion granting or denying 
the recognition of civil effect to ecclesiastical decisions dissolving an unconsummated marriage 
or declaring a marriage null and void. Under the preceding law, according to the interpretation 
of the Constitutional Court, recognition of civil effect in such cases had to be dismissed if one 
of the parties of the marriage filed a formal and non-arbitrary objection against the execution 
of the ecclesiastical decision. See STC 328/1993, Nov. 8, 1993. 
 53. For a clear and precise synthesis of the Spanish matrimonial system, see Rafael 
Navarro-Valls, El matrimonio religioso [Religious Marriage], in DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL 
ESTADO ESPAÑOL [ECCLESIASTICAL LAW OF THE SPANISH STATE] 351 (Javier Ferrer Ortiz 
cord., 4th ed. 1996). 
 54. Some of these claims involved the transitory provisions of the Concordat of 1979 
regulating judicial proceedings that had been initiated before ecclesiastical courts under the 
provisions of the Concordat of 1953 and were still pending at that moment. The pre-1991 
decisions of the Constitutional Court regarding canonical marriage are analyzed by 
RODRÍGUEZ CHACÓN, supra note 1, at 77–85. The most relevant decisions since 1991 are: 
STC 328/1993, 8 Nov. 1993 and STC 6/1997, 13 Jan. 1997. 
 55. See art. 7 of the agreements with the Evangelical, Jewish, and Islamic federations 
(translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra note 4). 
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does not recognize the civil validity of any other religious celebration 
of marriage. Legal scholars generally have justified this difference in 
legal treatment by arguing that an overwhelming majority of the 
Spanish population is Catholic and by remarking that in the Catholic 
canon law the coherence of the legislation and jurisprudence in the 
area of marriage is much higher than in the other religions.56 To 
date, the Constitutional Court has not resolved the issue and has as-
sumed that the granting of civil effect to canonical marriages is gov-
erned by the Concordat of 1979, an international treaty that has 
never been challenged as unconstitutional. 
2. Religious assistance to the armed forces 
The current system regulating the provision of Catholic religious 
assistance to the armed forces has also raised some questions with re-
gard to constitutional principles, but in this case the Constitutional 
Court was asked to decide the issue. Such assistance is provided by 
an ecclesiastical corps whose members are integrated into the hierar-
chical structure of the army. The Concordat of 1979 and some state 
laws govern this matter.57 
In 1982, a group of sixty-nine congressmen challenged the sys-
tem’s constitutionality in a motion of unconstitutionality (recurso de 
inconstitucionalidad),58 arguing that the system violated the neutral-
ity principle of the Spanish Constitution.59 According to their 
reasoning, there is no room in a neutral state for a system of religious 
assistance in which ministers of worship are classified as civil servants. 
For reasons of procedural coherence, the Constitutional Court 
resolved not to rule on the substantive issue of whether the system 
established by the Concordat of 1979 was constitutional.60 Never-
 
 56. See MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 13, at 166–69. 
 57. See Agreement on Religious Assistance to the Armed Forces, translated in SPANISH 
LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 69. For a more precise description of the legal regulation of 
Catholic religious assistance to the army, see CONTRERAS, supra note 17, at 398–500. 
 58. A brief explanation of the concept of recurso de inconstitucionalidad is provided su-
pra Part I. 
 59. Their motion was decided by STC 24/1982, May 13, 1982. (The antecedente 
[statement of facts] 2 contains a detailed explanation of the plaintiff’s arguments.) 
 60. The Court stated that there must be a coherence between the plaintiff’s claim and 
the content of the challenged law. See id. This coherence did not exist in this case, the Court 
declared, because the specific objective of the plaintiffs’ claim was a rule determining the years 
required for promotion in the different degrees of members of the army—Law 48/1981, Dec. 
24, 1981, art. 9(4)—which included a reference to members of the ecclesiastical corps. See id. 
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theless, the Court seemed to accept the reasoning of the state attor-
ney, who maintained that the system was constitutional because Par-
liament possessed the authority to determine the specific structure of 
the service of religious assistance to the armed forces. In this regard, 
the existing system of organic integration (integración orgánica) of 
Catholic clergymen into the armed forces was one of the legitimate 
choices that the legislature could make. 
In addition, the Court declared that providing Catholic religious 
assistance to the military was a way of facilitating the individual sol-
dier’s exercise of religious freedom, and the present system did not 
violate the equality principle as long as followers of other religions 
had the opportunity to receive their own religious assistance through 
appropriate channels: 
The fact that the State provides Catholic religious assistance to the 
members of the Armed Forces not only does not constitute any 
violation of the Constitution but, on the contrary, offers the possi-
bility to render actual the right to worship of individuals and com-
munities. The right to freedom of religion and worship does not 
undergo any pressure, for members of the Armed Forces are free to 
accept or refuse the assistance they are offered. The right to equal-
ity is not violated either, as the religious service in favor of Catho-
lics does not exclude religious assistance for the faithful of other re-
ligions, performed in due proportion and measure, which they can 
demand.61 
3. Religious education in public schools 
The teaching of the Catholic religion in public schools is another 
traditional example of state cooperation with the Catholic Church 
that originated during the era of state confessionality.62 The Concor-
dat of 1979 preserved the state’s obligation to provide religious in-
struction in all pre-university educational centers and university 
 
The Court held that the plaintiffs could not challenge the constitutionality of the entire system 
of religious assistance on that basis. In the words of the Court, “the motion of unconstitution-
ality [is not] a remedy that can be directed indiscriminately against a block of laws or against an 
entire part of the legal order; the motion of unconstitutionality must be aimed at judging the 
constitutionality of specific legal texts and formulas.” See id. at FJ 2 (author’s translation). 
 61. See id. at FJ 4 (author’s translation). 
 62. See Javier Escrivá Ivars, La enseñanza de la ‘religión y de la moral católicas’ en el sistema 
educativo español [The Teaching of ‘Catholic Religion and Morals’ in the Spanish Educational Sys-
tem], 4 A.D.E.E. 205, 210–16 (1988). 
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schools for teacher training.63 Student attendance at classes providing 
Catholic religious instruction is voluntary, but schools must include 
this type of instruction in their curricula “under the same conditions 
as the other basic disciplines.”64 Catholic religion teachers are ap-
pointed by ecclesiastical authorities, but they are paid by the state. 
Some scholars have contended that this system is not the most 
appropriate to implement the constitutional principles of equality 
and neutrality.65 They argue that it should be replaced by a system 
equal to that provided for the teaching of other religions—i.e., a sys-
tem that, as part of its normal curriculum, allows students to volun-
tarily receive religious education in any of several religions and that 
does not classify religious education as a “basic discipline.”66 The 
Constitutional Court, however, has never found the existing system 
to be unconstitutional. In any event, the issue of religious education 
has been a source of political tension between the state and ecclesias-
tical authorities over the years. For its part, the Catholic Church has 
been inflexible in demanding the enforcement of the Concordat of 
 
 63. See Agreement on Education and Cultural Affairs, arts. I–VII, translated in SPANISH 
LEGISLATION, supra note 4. 
 64. Id. art. IV. 
 65. For a detailed description of the different positions of Spanish scholars and the case law 
of the Spanish Supreme Court with regard to the system of Catholic religious teaching in public 
schools, see DAVID GARCÍA-PARDO, LA LIBERTAD DE ENSEÑANZA EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA DEL 
TRIBUNAL SUPREMO [FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN THE CASE LAW OF THE SPANISH SUPREME 
COURT] 260–92 (1998). 
 66. Spanish post-constitutional legislation gradually introduced, since 1980, the teach-
ing of non-Catholic religious doctrines in public schools. However, a law enacted in 1990 pro-
vided that this aspect of the state cooperation had to be governed by agreements between the 
state and religious denominations (Organic Law 1/1990, Oct. 3, 1990, of General Organiza-
tion of the Education System, second additional provision). The immediate effect of this stipu-
lation was to deprive non-Catholic religions of their right to provide religious teaching in pub-
lic schools, which some of them had enjoyed for ten years, because, apart from the 1979 
Concordat with the Catholic Church, no other agreement had yet been concluded between 
the Spanish state and a religious community. In 1992, the agreements with the Evangelical, 
Jewish, and Islamic federations (Article 10) guaranteed that the religious instruction of those 
religions could be provided in public schools and in private schools funded by the government. 
Nevertheless, these cooperative agreements have not provided a satisfactory solution for all 
religious denominations. For example, as the LDS Church was not included in the Evangelical 
federation—and was consequently left out of the 1992 set of agreements—its religious doc-
trine is no longer taught in Spanish public schools. The paradox is that the doctrine of the 
LDS Church had been the first non-Catholic religious doctrine included in the curricula of 
public schools, by virtue of some by-laws of the Ministry of Education. See Joaquín Mantecón, 
L’enseignement de la religion dans l’école publique espagnole [The Teaching of Religion in Spanish 
Public Schools], 30 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 277, 284–85, 294–95 (1999/2000). 
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1979, seeking recourse from the courts when necessary.67 
Two important education-related cases adjudicated by the Con-
stitutional Court concerned the teaching of “Theology and Peda-
gogy of Catholic Religion and Morals” in the school for teacher 
training at the Autonomous University of Madrid (Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid). The two cases involved the refusal of the 
governing bodies of the university to comply with the provisions of 
the 1979 Concordat. 
In the first decision, in 1991,68 the Court sustained the enforce-
ability of the Concordat of 1979’s provisions regarding Catholic 
education. University authorities had rejected to include Catholic in-
struction as an optional subject in the school’s curriculum. Specifi-
cally, the Court held that the stipulations of the Concordat, an in-
ternational treaty legitimately signed by the government and 
approved by the legislature, limited the university’s autonomy. Uni-
versity authorities therefore were obligated to include the teaching of 
Catholic doctrine as a voluntary curricular subject. Moreover, the 
Court declared that Article 27(3) of the Constitution supported this 
policy by recognizing the right of parents to ensure that their chil-
dren receive religious and moral instruction according to their be-
liefs.69 Consequently, the Court concluded, it was reasonable for fu-
ture teachers interested in teaching Catholicism to have the chance 
to receive the appropriate education from the school responsible for 
training them. 
In the other case, decided in 1997,70 the Court again ruled in fa-
vor of the Church. After being compelled by the Constitutional 
Court to comply with the ecclesiastical demands to offer the relevant 
classes, the university had assigned a very reduced number of credits 
to that subject. The ecclesiastical authorities went to court for a sec-
ond time, obtaining a favorable judgment. The Constitutional Court 
accepted the reasoning of the lower courts. It held that, while the 
 
 67. For a recent analysis of the different problems arising from the relationship between 
freedom of religion and freedom of teaching in Spain, see José M. Martí, Factor religioso y en-
señanza en España [The Religious Factor and Education in Spain], 16 A.D.E.E. 399 (2000). 
 68. STC 187/1991, Oct. 3, 1991. 
 69. Article 27(3) of the Constitution specifically states: “The public authorities guaran-
tee the right of parents to ensure that their children receive religious and moral instruction that 
is in accordance with [the parents’] own convictions” (translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, 
supra note 4, at 25–40). 
 70. STC 155/1987, Sept. 29, 1997. 
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university could autonomously specify the number of credits 
awarded for its Catholic religious courses, the Concordat of 1979 
necessarily bound the institution to keeping the credits awarded in 
fair proportion with other “basic disciplines.” In this regard, the 
Court found that the university’s assignment of only four credits to 
its Catholic religion courses was clearly disproportionate in relation 
to the number of credits assigned to other basic disciplines such as 
plastic arts and music, which were worth eighteen and twenty-four 
credits, respectively. 
It should be noted that the rule that public schools must offer 
courses on Catholic religion “under the same conditions as the other 
basic disciplines” does not mean that religion teachers must be 
treated the same as teachers of other subjects. In fact, religion teach-
ers receive different legal treatment in two ways. First, they are paid 
the same salary as interim teachers, which is lower than the salary 
paid to ordinary permanent teachers. Second, they are not eligible to 
become school directors. Both differences have been declared legiti-
mate by Spain’s Constitutional Court on the grounds that the ap-
pointment of religion teachers is not permanent but has to be done 
every year by ecclesiastical authorities. This fact justifies both placing 
them on the same economic level as interim teachers and disqualify-
ing them from serving as school directors who are elected for a 
three-year term.71 
4. Financial support 
The Catholic Church has received economic aid from the Span-
ish state since the state’s massive confiscation of Church properties 
that took place in the mid-nineteenth century, especially between 
1836 and 1854 (this is the process historically known as desamorti-
zación, or confiscation of mortmain property).72 Indeed, the state’s 
aid was conceived as a sort of compensation for that deprivation of  
 
 
 
 71. See ATC 1155/1987, Oct. 26, 1987 (concerning the salaries of religion teachers) 
and STC 47/1990, Mar. 20, 1990 (concerning religion teachers’ disqualification for serving as 
school directors). 
 72. On the subject of desamortización, see generally FRANCISCO TOMÁS Y VALIENTE, 
EL MARCO POLÍTICO DE LA DESAMORTIZACIÓN EN ESPAÑA [THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
THE 19TH CENTURY CONFISCATION OF MORTMAIN ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY BY THE 
STATE IN SPAIN] (2d ed. 1972). 
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property. The forms of this economic cooperation have varied over 
the last century and a half.73 
According to the Concordat of 1979 and subsequent legislation, 
the Church may receive three types of financial aid from the state.74 
First, under the tax assignment (asignación tributaria) system, Span-
ish citizens are allowed to assign a small percentage of their income 
tax—slightly more than 0.5 percent—to the Catholic Church. Sec-
ond, ecclesiastical institutions are exempt from the payment of a 
number of taxes. Third, donations made by individuals and corpora-
tions to the Catholic Church are tax deductible up to a certain per-
centage. 
Under current Spanish law, the state economic cooperation with 
non-Catholic religions is different. Tax assignment remains an exclu-
sive privilege of the Catholic Church. The deductibility of donations, 
on the contrary, has become widely available, first through the 1992 
Agreements with the Evangelical, Jewish, and Islamic communities,75 
and then more generally through the 1994 Law of Foundations, 
which extended the privilege to donations made to any—religious or 
non-religious—charitable organization.76 The non-Catholic religious 
communities included in the 1992 Agreements have also been 
granted tax exemptions that are very similar to those enjoyed by the 
Catholic Church.77 
 
 73. See generally JOSÉ R. GONZÁLEZ ARMENDIA, SISTEMAS HISTÓRICOS DE DOTACIÓN 
DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL A LA IGLESIA ESPAÑOLA: SIGLOS XIX–XX [HISTORICAL SYSTEMS OF 
SPANISH STATE’S FINANCIAL AID TO THE SPANISH CHURCH: NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH 
CENTURIES] (1990). 
 74. See generally María Blanco, Cooperación del estado con las confesiones religiosas en ma-
teria económica [Economic State Cooperation with Religious Denominations], in TRATADO DE 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO, supra note 14, at 631; JOSÉ CAMARASA, RÉGIMEN TRIBUTARIO DE 
ENTIDADES RELIGIOSAS Y ENTIDADES SIN FINES DE LUCRO [TAX REGIME OF CHARITABLE AND 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS] (1998). 
 75. See Article 11(6) of both the Agreement with the Evangelical Federation (Agree-
ment of cooperation between the State and the Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities in 
Spain) and the Agreement with the Jewish Federation (Agreement of cooperation between the 
State and the Federation of Israelite communities in Spain) and Article 11(5) of the Agreement 
with the Islamic Federation (Agreement of cooperation between the State and the Islamic Com-
mission of Spain), all three of which are translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 
75–113.  
 76. See Law 30/1994, Nov. 24, 1994, sixth additional provision, translated in SPANISH 
LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 157–63. 
 77. See generally Zoila Combalía, Financiación de las confesiones no católicas en el Derecho 
español [The Financing of Non-Catholic Religions under Spanish Law], in 10 A.D.E.E. 431 
(1994); MARIANO LÓPEZ ALARCÓN, LAS FUNDACIONES ECLESIÁSTICAS BAJO EL NUEVO 
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However, prior to the state’s first efforts to extend limited eco-
nomic privileges to certain non-Catholic religions in the 1992 
Agreements, a small Evangelical community filed a motion of protec-
tion (recurso de amparo)78 before the Constitutional Court, invoking 
the equality principle and claiming the right to receive the same tax 
exemptions as the Catholic Church. The Court dismissed the claim 
in a poorly reasoned decision,79 affirming that the two churches’ very 
different circumstances justified disparate treatment on the part of 
the state. With respect to the churches’ dissimilar circumstances, the 
Court specifically referred to history (the nineteenth century desam-
ortización), existing agreements between the Catholic Church and 
the state (the Concordat of 1979), and the large disparity in social 
support enjoyed by the two churches (the Evangelical Community of 
German Language of the Balearic Islands possessed a very small 
number of members in comparison to the Spanish Catholic Church). 
Though all of the factual differences cited by the Court were 
indisputable and could justify different degrees of state 
cooperation—even of strictly economic cooperation—there are some 
flaws in the Court’s reasoning. The justification for granting tax 
exemptions to churches should pertain primarily to the non-profit 
character of religious activities, rather than to history, bilateral 
institutional relationships, or social influence. Therefore, the Court 
should have examined whether both churches’ religious activities 
were equivalent in nature. If the answer to that inquiry had been 
affirmative—as it appears it should have been—it would have been 
difficult for the Court to conclude that churches’ unequal tax status 
had an “objective and reasonable justification.”80 
 
RÉGIMEN DE LA LEY 30/1994, DE FUNDACIONES EINCENTIVOS FISCALES [ECCLESIASTICAL 
FOUNDATIONS UNDER THE NEW REGIME OF THE LAW OF FOUNDATIONS AND TAX INCENTIVES] 
(1997); MARÍA M. MARTÍN GARCÍA, LAS FUNDACIONES RELIGIOSAS EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL: 
ESPECIAL REFERENCIA AL DERECHO AUTONÓMICO [RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS IN SPANISH LAW: 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AUTONOMOUS LAW] (1995). 
 78. For a succinct explanation of this concept, see supra Part I. 
 79. ATC 480/1989, Oct. 2, 1989. The decision is criticized, with consistent argu-
ments, in RODRÍGUEZ CHACÓN, supra note 1, at 99–101. A similar claim submitted to the 
European Commission of Human Rights was declared inadmissible as “manifestly ill-
founded.” Iglesia Bautista “El Salvador” v. Spain, Dec. Adm.17522/90, available in 
<http://www.echr.coe.int> (visited Mar. 24, 2001). 
 80. As it is well known, this is the key concept employed to interpret the equality princi-
ple in the doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights as well as the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court. According to this doctrine, differences in legal treatment are acceptable if they 
are grounded on an objective and reasonable justification and pursue a legitimate aim through 
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5. The protection of religion in the Criminal Code 
In Spain, as in many European countries, there exists an old tra-
dition of protecting religion through the Criminal Code.81 Part of 
this protection consists in penalizing blasphemy as well as public 
abuse or derision of a religion and its tenets or rites. During Spain’s 
history as a confessional state, Spanish criminal law specifically pro-
tected Catholicism. In 1983, the Criminal Code was amended to ex-
tend its protection of the population’s religious sentiments to all re-
ligious denominations. Significantly, the title of the relevant section 
of the Code was changed to “Crimes Against Freedom of Con-
science.” 
On two occasions, the Constitutional Court has affirmed the 
constitutionality of this type of protection of religious freedom. In 
1984, with regard to a challenge based on the equality principle, the 
Court affirmed that penalizing blasphemy “does not imply that a de-
termined church or religious denomination is granted a privileged 
treatment, for the idea of God or the notion of the sacred are not the 
exclusive patrimony of any of them in particular.”82 Similarly in 
1986, the Court held that the crime of offense to religion—public 
abuse or derision—did not violate the constitutional principle of 
neutrality, since Article 209 of the Criminal Code had been amended 
in 1983 to eliminate the reference to “the Catholic Church or other 
confessions legally recognized.” Consequently, the protection of-
fered by the Criminal Code covered every religion and not only a 
particular church. This latter situation certainly would be unconstitu-
tional. Moreover, the Court declared that a religiously neutral state 
may use criminal laws to protect the population’s religious senti-
ments because such state action pursues the legitimate aim of safe-
 
proportionate means. See Javier Martínez-Torrón, El derecho de libertad religiosa en la jurispru-
dencia en torno al Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos [Right to Religious Freedom in the 
Case Law derived from the European Convention on Human Rights], in 2 A.D.E.E. 403, 466–
74 (1986); Daniel Tirapu & Antonio C. Pereira, Observaciones sobre la jurisprudencia consti-
tucional en materia de igualdad y carácter social del Estado de Derecho [Some Observations on the 
Constitutional Jurisprudence Related to the Equality Principle and the Social Character of a Democ-
ratic State], in 1 EL PRINCIPIO DE IGUALDAD EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [THE EQUALITY 
PRINCIPLE IN THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION] 961 (1991). 
 81. See generally JUAN FERREIRO, PROTECCIÓN JURÍDICO PENAL DE LA RELIGIÓN 
[PROTECTION OF RELIGION THROUGH CRIMINAL LAW] (1998); FRANCISCA PÉREZ-MADRID, 
LA TUTELA PENAL DEL FACTOR RELIGIOSO EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL [PROTECTION OF THE 
RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN SPANISH CRIMINAL LAW] (1995). 
 82. ATC 271/1984, May 9, 1984, FJ 2. 
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guarding its citizens’ rights and freedoms, particularly their freedom 
of religion.83 
Significantly, Spain’s new Criminal Code, enacted in 1995, has 
continued the practice of criminalizing abuse or derision of religion, 
at the same time providing that the same punishment must be im-
posed for public offenses against non-believers.84 
6. The teaching of canon law in state universities 
In 1985, the Constitutional Court decided an atypical case, fo-
cused not on the equality principle, but on the principle of neutrality 
and its relationship with the historical influence of Catholicism on 
Spanish history.85 
Up through the 1980s, the official curriculum of legal studies, 
established by the Spanish Ministry of Education in 1953, required 
all law schools—both private and public—to offer mandatory sec-
ond-year courses on Catholic canon law.86 At the time, the study of 
law comprised a five-year-long program with twenty five subjects, all 
of which were mandatory. In 1983, a student of a state law school 
asked university authorities to be exempted from the study of canon 
law, alleging that it was against her religious and ideological convic-
tions protected by Article 16 of the Constitution. Her petition was 
denied both by the university administration and by the courts that 
decided the lawsuits she subsequently initiated. The student finally 
filed a claim (recurso de amparo) before the Constitutional Court, 
challenging the constitutionality of the curriculum upon two 
grounds: she argued that mandatory study of canon law violated her 
freedom of ideology and religion as well as the constitutional princi-
ple of state neutrality in religious matters. 
 
 
 83. See ATC 180/1986, Feb. 21, 1986, FJ 2. 
 84. See C.P. [“Código Penal”], art. 525. For additional discussion of this topic, see 
ISIDORO MARTÍN SÁNCHEZ, EL DERECHO A LA FORMACIÓN DE LA CONCIENCIA Y SU TUTELA 
PENAL [THE RIGHT TO FORM ONE’S OWN CONSCIENCE AND ITS PROTECTION BY CRIMINAL 
LAW] 247–319 (2000); Ana Fernández-Coronado, El contenido de la tutela de la libertad de 
conciencia en el Código Penal de 1995 [The Content of the Protection of Freedom of Conscience in 
the Criminal Code of 1995], 52 REVISTA DEL PODER JUDICIAL 135 (1998). 
 85. ATC 359/1085, May 29, 1985. 
 86. The decision commented here, and the entire issue of the teaching of canon law in 
the Spanish law schools, has been analyzed in Rafael Navarro-Valls, La enseñanza del derecho 
canónico en la jurisprudencia española [Teaching of Canon Law in the Case Law of Spanish 
Courts], 1 A.D.E.E. 49 (1985). 
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In dismissing the claim, the Constitutional Court essentially 
reproduced the reasoning of the ordinary courts that had previously 
ruled for the state. The Court posited that an issue of unconstitu-
tionality might arise if the study of canon law were imposed “with an 
aim of indoctrination.” The Court then found that the mandatory 
study of canon law failed to meet this requirement, stating that: 
Canon law, as a subject based upon the explanation and interpreta-
tion of a corpus iuris, the Code of Canon Law, is not a subject of 
ideological content by its nature, although it is grounded on a dog-
matic or confessional substratum as the doctrine of the Catholic 
Church. Indeed many juridical disciplines are centered on the study 
of legal texts and theories whose ideological substratum is percepti-
ble.87 
The Court then concluded that: 
[I]n the end, it might be alleged, as the plaintiff does, that the 
compulsory study of canon law in State universities is a reminis-
cence of the confessional State, and that . . . its maintenance nowa-
days has no other reason or cause that the indirect apologia of a re-
ligious faith. However the ordinary experience of any lawyer 
demonstrates that this is not true.88 
In sum, the Constitutional Court recognized that canon law was 
taught in state universities for a secular purpose, namely, as a subject 
useful for legal practice—canonical marriage is granted extensive civil 
effects in Spain, as stated above89—and also as an essential part of 
Spanish legal tradition (and, in general, of the entire Western legal 
culture).90 In other words, Spanish law students learned canon law as 
a cultural and not confessional factor, much for the same reasons that 
they study Roman law or legal history. Naturally, whether the study 
of canon law is a necessary element of legal education remains an 
open question.91 In fact, in the late 1980s, the Ministry of Education 
gave all Spanish law schools more curricular freedom in general and 
removed canon law in particular from the list of required subjects. 
 
 87. ATC 359/1085, FJ 3. (author’s translation). 
 88. Id. (author’s translation). 
 89. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 90. See generally JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW AND CANON 
LAW: CANONICAL ROOTS OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1998). 
 91. We should bear in mind that at that time all subjects were mandatory in the curric-
ula of Spanish law schools. 
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However, this latter option pertains to the realm of academic choices 
that the Ministry of Education can legitimately make when designing 
the law schools curricula and is something very different from deem-
ing that obligatory study of canon law is unconstitutional in a neutral 
state. 92 
B. New Religious Movements 
As stated in the preceding section, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court, in deciding cases related to the legal position of the Catholic 
Church, has dealt, directly and indirectly, with the legal status of 
non-Catholic religious denominations, especially in regard to finan-
cial issues, the provision of religious assistance to the military, and 
the protection of religion through criminal law. When ruling on 
these issues, the Court often made use of the principle of equality as 
its main criterion for decision and had in mind all religions in general 
and no one in particular. 
In this section, I will comment on three recent cases specifically 
related to the legal position of the so-called new religious move-
ments (“NRMs”), i.e., religious groups that are usually distinguished 
by these two characteristics: they have a more recent history than 
major Western religions—they were born in the nineteenth or twen-
tieth century—and often preach tenets and practice moral values that 
contrast with the beliefs and values normally accepted within West-
ern societies. 
1. Spanish attitudes towards NRMs 
The first case, decided in June 2000,93 stemmed from the 1988 
arrest of the president of the Church of Scientology International 
following a four-year police investigation. Prosecutors accused him 
of several crimes—including illegal association, fiscal offenses, in-
ducement to commit suicide, and crimes against public health—and 
initiated criminal proceedings against him. The defendant sought re-
dress from the Constitutional Court, arguing that various procedural 
irregularities in the case violated his right to due process of law under 
Article 24 of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the claim in a 
 
 92. Indeed, a number of public law schools presently offer optional or even mandatory 
courses on canon law. 
 93. STC 155/2000, June 12, 2000. 
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short decision, finding that the defendant had failed to exhaust the 
non-constitutional remedies available before the ordinary courts. 
Specifically, the Court labeled the claim as premature because the 
criminal proceedings against the defendant had not yet concluded.94 
Neither the defendant’s arguments nor the Court’s reasoning are 
significant to the Constitutional Court’s case law on religious free-
dom. However, the facts underlying the case may reveal a certain 
governmental policy of discrimination against some new religious 
movements that are atypical in the Spanish social milieu. Spanish so-
ciety and authorities sometimes treat NRMs with diffidence and fol-
low a pattern that seems inconsistent with the Constitution.95 This 
restrictive approach towards NRMs is apparently not official policy. 
Rather, it stems from a conservative notion of religion that still per-
vades Spanish society and government, i.e., a notion derived from 
the religions traditionally existing in Spain: Judaism, Catholicism, Is-
lam, and conventional Protestantism. Some NRMs, especially those 
that appear to be wealthy or foreign in origin, are considered ex-
travagant, even dangerous, and often not at all religious in nature.96 
It is interesting to note that the Spanish government had not ac-
cepted the Church of Scientology into the Registry of Religious En-
tities. The consequence was that this church could not obtain legal 
personality as a religious group, although this fact does not impair its 
constitutional right to religious freedom.97 Spanish authorities had 
 
 94. Id. at FJ 3. The criminal trial against Scientology leaders in Spain is taking place at 
the time this article went to print. 
 95. The facts of the case Riera Blume v. Spain, decided by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, Oct. 14, 1999, are also revealing in this regard. The applicants were members of 
the Esoteric Center of Investigations (Centro Esotérico de Investigaciones). Following the issu-
ance of a judicial order, the applicants’ homes were searched, and the applicants themselves, all 
of whom were adults, were subsequently confined in a nearby hotel against their will for “de-
programming.” The confinement of the applicants, however, was not supported by any judicial 
order; rather, it was carried out by a private “anti-sect” association with the consent of the ap-
plicants’ families and the limited cooperation of the Catalan police. The Court avoided pro-
nouncing any opinion under Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (free-
dom of religion), but decided in favor of the applicants under Article 5.1 of the European 
Convention (right to liberty and security).  
 96. For a broad discussion of this subject, see generally AGUSTÍN MOTILLA, SECTAS Y 
DERECHO EN ESPAÑA: UN ESTUDIO EN TORNO A LA POSICIÓN DE LOS NUEVOS MOVIMIENTOS 
RELIGIOSOS EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO [SECTS AND LAW IN SPAIN: A STUDY 
REGARDING THE POSITION OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN THE LEGAL ORDER] (1990). 
 97. Created by Article 5 of the Organic Law of Religious Freedom, the Registry of Reli-
gious Entities keeps a record of the religious denominations operating in Spain, as well as the 
internal institutions created by churches and religious communities. Therefore, the Registry 
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determined that the Scientology Church had not provided sufficient 
evidence to prove its religious character, according to the administra-
tive and judicial interpretation of the legal concept of religion, which 
is a central concept in the Organic Law of Religious Freedom.98 
2. NRMs and the notion of religion in Spanish law 
The Church of Unification was in a situation similar to the 
Church of Scientology. Spanish administrative authorities had not 
allowed it to register as a religious group, arguing: (i) that it was not 
a religious organization, and (ii) that it developed activities that were 
contrary to the public order and morals, and, therefore, should be 
considered a “dangerous sect.” In subsequent lawsuits brought by 
this church, the courts decided in favor of the Spanish government. 
Finally, five years ago, the Church of Unification filed a complaint 
with the Constitutional Court, alleging that its right to religious 
freedom (Article 16 C.E.) as well as its right to presumption of inno-
cence (Article 24(2) C.E.) had been violated. The Court’s decision 
was delivered in February 2001, together with a dissenting opinion 
signed by four justices.99 
Naturally, the main issue was the notion of religion in Spanish 
law. Until now, the General Directorate of Religious Affairs as well 
as the courts had adopted a legal concept of religion rooted in the 
 
constitutes the filter through which the Spanish government controls which organizations are 
granted legal personality as religious denominations. Registration with the Registry is volun-
tary, but religious groups desiring to register must supply evidence demonstrating that they 
have a “religious purpose.” If a group is not allowed to register as a religious entity, it can ob-
tain legal personality in Spain through registration in the general Registry of Associations. In 
any event, legal personality, acquired through any of those two ways, does not constitute a 
condition for the exercise of religious freedom in Spain, which is guaranteed by Article 16 of 
the Constitution “with no other restriction on their expression than may be necessary to main-
tain public order as protected by law.” See Dolores García Hervás & Carmen Garcimartín, La 
interpretación del concepto ‘fines religiosos’ en la práctica administrativa y judicial española [The 
Interpretation of the Concept of “Religious Purpose” in Spanish Administrative and Judicial 
Practice], in FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE, supra note 1, at 497; María J. Roca, 
Aproximación al concepto de fines religiosos [Some Observations on the Concept of Religious Purpose], 
132 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA 445 (1993). 
 98. Article 3(2) of the Organic Law provides that the law will not be applied to entities 
with non-religious aims, such as “the study of and experimentation with psychic or parapsy-
chological phenomena or the dissemination of humanistic or spiritualistic values” (translated in 
SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 42–43). 
 99. STC 46/2001, Feb. 15, 2001. The antecedentes [statement of facts] of this decision 
describe in detail the administrative and judicial itinerary of the Church of Unification’s com-
plaint. 
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traditional monotheistic heritage of Western culture. Accordingly, 
the Spanish legal notion of a religious denomination was character-
ized by three elements: the belief in a Supreme Being developed into 
tenets and moral commands, an external worship, and a certain insti-
tutional organization.100 
The Constitutional Court decided in favor of the plaintiff and 
ruled that the Church of Unification must be given the right to be 
recorded in the Registry of Religious Entities. Anticipated for a long 
time,101 this decision was supposed to be important in order to clarify 
the legal notion of religion, but is rather disappointing in this regard, 
for the Court’s reasoning contains a few significant flaws and is 
sometimes contradictory. The decision on the Church of Unifica-
tion’s right to register deserves an extensive comment, but for the 
purposes of this article, it will be sufficient to emphasize only two as-
pects of the Court’s reasoning. 
First, the Court does not shed any light at all on the questions 
raised by the legal concept of religion in Spain but rather seems to 
render this concept inoperative. According to the decision, the au-
thorities in charge of the Registry do not have any discretion, or 
margin of appreciation, to examine the religious nature of any group 
that has applied to register; they must limit themselves to confirm 
that this group is not excluded from registration by Article 3(2) of 
the Organic Law of Religious Freedom.102 Nevertheless, this provi-
sion indeed states that “[a]ctivities, purposes and entities relating to 
or engaging in the study of and experimentation with psychic or 
parapsychological phenomena or the dissemination of humanistic or 
spiritualistic values or other similar non-religious aims do not qualify 
for the protection provided in this Act.”103 In consequence, adminis-
trative authorities do of necessity have to issue a judgment—implicit 
or explicit—on the religious nature and purposes of the applicant 
group. 
 
 
 100. See MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 13, at 74–88. 
 101. The recurso de amparo was filed on July 1996, and a decision was expected, at least, 
since the second half of 1999. Apparently, the delay was due to the strongly opposite views of 
the subject held by different justices of the Court. This fact might also explain why the reason-
ing of the decision is so inconsistent. 
 102. See STC 46/2001, FJ 8. 
 103. Organic Law of Religious Freedom, art. 3(2), translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, 
supra note 4, at 42–43. 
14TOR-FIN.DOC 6/25/01   
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
744 
In the future, however, because the Court held that authorities 
do not enjoy any discretion in the matter but at the same time did 
not provide any criteria for the interpretation of Article 3(2) of the 
Organic Law, the Registry will probably have to accept every applica-
tion without further inquiries (except in the unlikely hypothesis that 
the applicant group explicitly recognizes, in the documents supplied 
for registration, that it is a non-religious organization). The immedi-
ate effect of this is that Article 3(2) of the Organic Law, which in 
practice is applied through the activity of the Registry of Religious 
Entities, has become void. In other words, with this 2001 decision, 
the Court has virtually eliminated the power of control given by the 
Organic Law to the Registry and has thus modified, almost surrepti-
tiously, one of the foundations of the Spanish law on religious de-
nominations.104 
There is another aspect of this decision of the Constitutional 
Court that is worth commenting on here: the Court’s reference to 
public order as a limit to the exercise of religious freedom, which is 
mentioned by Article 16 of the Constitution.105 In this regard, the 
Court remarked, “[T]he exceptional character of public order as the 
only limit to the exercise” of religious liberty. Consequently, the 
Court held that 
public order can not be interpreted as a clause preventive of hypo-
thetical risks, for in that case the clause itself would become the 
largest sure danger for the exercise of that freedom . . . . [A]s a 
general rule, only when the courts have certified the existence of a 
definite danger for “public safety, health and morals” according to 
the rules of a democratic society, it is appropriate to invoke public 
order as a limit to the exercise of the right to freedom of religion 
and worship.106 
In my view, the prior statements are very positive. However, the 
Court restricted their significance when it immediately added that 
there are “certain sects or groups” that use illegal “recruitment 
methods that may impair the free development of their followers’ 
personality,” and therefore “the exceptional preventive use of[] the 
public order clause” is not unconstitutional, as far as the danger is 
“duly ascertained” and the restrictive measures against a group are 
 
 104. See MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 2, 195–204. 
 105. See C.E. art. 16, supra note 10 (reprinting the provision in full). 
 106. STC 46/2001, FJ 11. 
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“proportionate and adequate to the aims pursued.”107 The main flaw 
of this reasoning is, of course, that the Court does not indicate more 
precisely which elements can justify the exceptional recourse to the 
public order clause without the courts’ intervention, and it does not 
explain either how the dangerous character of a ‘sect’ can be “duly 
ascertained” without a judicial procedure and a public hearing of 
those under suspicion. This fact leaves the door open to possible sur-
veillance of some groups by police activities that are not backed by a 
judicial order or by any evidence other than mere suspicion.108 
In any event, in the case at issue, the Court held that the evi-
dence provided by the government with respect to the alleged dan-
gerous activities of the Church of Unification was inconsistent and 
even, sometimes, contradictory.109 Consequently, the church—whose 
religious character, as stated above, could not be scrutinized by 
Spanish authorities—had the right to be registered in the Registry of 
Religious Entities. 
Beyond the effects directly related to the registration of the Uni-
fication Church as a religious organization, this 2001 decision of the 
Constitutional Court will probably produce two other effects with a 
wider scope. First, other groups not considered until now religious 
by the government will be also allowed to register in the Registry of 
Religious Entities; the Church of Scientology will likely be one of 
them, as it has been applying for registration unsuccessfully for many 
years. The second effect is that the government will have to study the 
opportunity—or even the necessity—of modifying some aspects of 
the law regulating the Registry of Religious Entities110 and perhaps 
 
 107. All the literal quotation included in this and the previous paragraph are taken from 
STC 46/2001, FJ 11. 
 108. Activities of this type were indeed at issue in a recent case decided by the European 
Court of Human Rights: Tsavachidis v. Greece, Jan. 21, 1999. The case related to the surveil-
lance of Jehovah’s Witnesses by the National Intelligence Service. It ended in a friendly settle-
ment in which the Greek government agreed to pay a sum of money for the costs and submit-
ted a formal statement declaring that “the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not, and will not in the 
future be, subject to any surveillance on account of their religious beliefs.” By then the Euro-
pean Commission had already elaborated its report on the merits of the case, and expressed the 
opinion that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention (by a vote of 
13 to 4) and there had been no violation of Article 9 (by a vote of 9 to 8). 
 109. See 46/2001, FJ 12-13. 
 110. The main law governing the Registry of Religious Entities is the Royal Decree 
concerning the organization and functioning of the Registry of Religious Entities, 142/1981, 
Jan. 9, 1981 (translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 123–26). 
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also the Organic Law of Religious Freedom.111 
3. NRMs and family law disputes 
In May 2000, the Constitutional Court decided another case in-
volving a new religious movement in the context of marital dissolu-
tion.112 In that case, a convert to the Movimiento Gnóstico Cristiano 
Universal de España (“Universal Christian Gnostic Movement of 
Spain”)113 had separated from his wife. She blamed his new religion 
for the failure of their marriage, a view that he did not share. Their 
two children, ages five and twelve, remained in the mother’s custody. 
In the custodial proceedings, the judge granted the father the usual 
visitation rights—the children would stay with him every other 
weekend and for half of the Christmas, Easter, and summer vacation 
periods—but explicitly prohibited him from proselytizing his chil-
dren or taking them to any religious meeting. 
The wife appealed the decision. She argued that, according to a 
psychological report, her husband showed some abnormal emotional 
alterations and a diminished perception of reality. In addition, she 
observed that the report stated that all available information on the 
husband’s new religion suggested that it might constitute a “destruc-
tive sect.” All these circumstances constituted, in the wife’s opinion, 
a serious risk to the children’s psychological health and education, 
which required a single religious and moral orientation. The court of 
appeals substantially accepted the mother’s reasoning and severely 
restricted the father’s visitation rights: he could see his children in al-
ternate weekends, but only during the daytime, and the vacation pe-
riods were suppressed.114 
 
 111. Indeed the General Directorate of Religious Affairs has been studying, in recent 
years, the possibility of modifying the 1980 Organic Law of Religious Freedom. However, the 
early drafts produced by the Directorate were aimed at making registration of groups more 
difficult and not easier as the 2001 decision of the Constitutional Court has ordered. 
 112. STC 141/2000, May 29, 2000. 
 113. The movement had been registered in the ordinary Registry of Associations in 1991 
but not in the Registry of Religious Entities. This fact suggests that the movement could not, 
or would not, register as a religious organization. See supra note 97. 
 114. This case presented many similarities—and some significant differences—with the 
facts of Hoffmann v. Austria, decided by the European Court of Human Rights on June 23, 
1993. (Notably, the Hoffman decision was cited repeatedly by the Spanish Constitutional 
Court in FJ 3-5 of the decision.) In Hoffman, a housewife who had converted to the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses had taken her children with her when divorce proceedings with the children’s father 
were still pending. The European Court of Human Rights reversed the decisions of Austrian 
national courts, which had granted custody of the children to the father, under Article 14 of 
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The Spanish Constitutional Court reversed the court of appeals 
decision, holding that the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights 
could not be arbitrarily reduced by the courts on account of his reli-
gious beliefs, regardless of how strange those ideas might appear in a 
certain social milieu, without proof that the children’s health or edu-
cation were endangered. 
In reaching this holding, the Court first noted that the right to 
religious freedom implied a sphere of legitimate behavior (agere li-
cere) protected by the Constitution and emphasized that restrictions 
to that right must be narrowly construed. The extreme reduction of 
the father’s visitation rights and the judicial prohibition of proselytiz-
ing his children seriously restricted his freedom of belief.115 Conse-
quently, the Court proceeded to examine whether that restriction 
was justified. It concluded that the judicial reduction of the plaintiff’s 
visitation rights pursued a legitimate aim, namely, the protection of 
the best interest of his children. Furthermore, it affirmed that the ju-
dicial order banning the father’s proselytism was justified to safe-
guard the “moral integrity” of the children.116  
However, the Constitutional Court found that the drastic reduc-
tion in his visitation rights decreed by the court of appeals was a 
measure clearly disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued be-
cause there was no evidence that the father had tried to convert his 
children, or take them to any religious meeting, or that the children 
had been negatively affected in any way by their father’s belief.117 
These factors led the Court to conclude that the decision of the 
court of appeals rested only on the factually unsupported assumption 
that the Gnostic Movement was a dangerous sect. Hence, the plain-
tiff had been the victim of discriminatory treatment on account of his 
beliefs, and Article 16 of the Constitution had been violated.118 
 
the European Convention (principle of equality) in conjunction with Article 8 (right to respect 
for private and family life). 
In my opinion, although the principles stated by the European Court are correct, the 
decision was erroneous. According to the couple’s marital agreement, their children had to be 
educated in the spouses’ common religion, which at the time was Catholicism. The wife uni-
laterally violated that agreement. It is very significant that the decision was adopted by a vote 
of five to four. The decision of the court was accompanied by several dissenting opinions; the 
one written by Judge Mifsud Bonnici is particularly interesting. 
 115. See STC 141/2000, May 29, 2000, FJ 4. 
 116. See id. at FJ 5. 
 117. See id. at FJ 6. 
 118. See id. at FJ 7. 
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V. THE INDIVIDUAL’S FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 
As stated above, the Spanish Constitutional Court has not articu-
lated any legal concept of religion to guide ordinary courts and ad-
ministrative authorities. However, the Court has emphasized in nu-
merous decisions that religious freedom demands an expansive 
interpretation of its content and a narrow construction of its limits. 
Individuals’ freedom of religion and conscience preserves an envi-
ronment of legitimate behavior (agere licere) that the state cannot 
invade and must protect against other individuals or groups. This 
freedom confers upon individuals the right to express their beliefs, 
which includes the right to accommodate their behavior to their 
conscience and the right not to face discrimination on account of 
that behavior. Naturally, religious liberty is not an absolute freedom. 
Thus, Article 16 of the Constitution provides that it can be restricted 
“to maintain public order as protected by law.” The courts are enti-
tled, even obliged, to judge when and how the external expression of 
religious freedom may have breached the “public order,” and they 
must do it following restrictive criteria.119 
The foregoing general ideas seem very reasonable, but they have 
not always been reasonably applied. It has occurred especially in 
some cases involving conscientious objection, i.e., when an individ-
ual requests exemption from a legal obligation that collides with a 
moral command. The doctrine of the Constitutional Court is some-
what muddled on this subject.120 
Through the mid-1980s, the Court based its decisions in the 
matter upon an expansive interpretation of freedom of conscience. 
Thus, in 1982, in one of its first decisions on conscientious objection 
to military service, the Court declared that there existed a direct 
connection between conscientious objection and freedom of con-
science, which is a particular aspect of the freedom of ideology en-
shrined in Article 16 of the Constitution. Conscientious objection  
 
 
 
 119. See STC 24/1982, May 13, 1982; STC 20/1990, Feb. 15, 1990; STC 120/1990, 
June 27, 1990; STC 137/1990, July 19, 1990; STC 141/2000, May 29, 2000; STC of Feb. 
15, 2001, deciding the “recurso de amparo” 3083/96; see also ATC 617/1984, Oct. 31, 1984; 
and ATC 551/1985, July 24, 1985. 
 120. See RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS & JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, LAS OBJECIONES DE 
CONCIENCIA EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL Y COMPARADO [CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS IN 
SPANISH AND COMPARATIVE LAW] 20–25 (1997). 
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was therefore “a right recognized explicitly and implicitly in the 
Spanish constitutional order.”121 
The Court applied a similarly expansive view of religious freedom 
in a large and complex decision of 1985 that resolved a motion of 
unconstitutionality (recurso de inconstitucionalidad)122 filed by a 
group of congressmen against the first statute in Spanish recent his-
tory that decriminalized abortion in certain circumstances. One of 
the plaintiffs’ arguments was that the challenged statute did not con-
tain any provision aimed to protect the conscientious objection that 
doctors, nurses, or other hospital staff might formulate.123 The Court 
dismissed that argument, affirming that, even when a particular case 
of objection did not have specific statutory support, freedom of con-
science could be alleged: 
The right to conscientious objection . . . exists and can be exercised 
independently from the fact that it has been regulated by a statute 
or not. Conscientious objection is an integral part of the funda-
mental right to freedom of ideology and religion, recognized in Ar-
ticle 16(1) of the Constitution; and, as this Court has repeatedly 
indicated, the Constitution can be directly applied, especially when 
fundamental rights are concerned.124 
However, beginning with a series of cases decided in the mid-to 
late-1980s, the Constitutional Court has taken an overly restrictive 
approach to the rights of individual conscience. Most surprisingly, it 
has done so without overruling its previous decisions, which em-
ployed an expansive interpretation of religious freedom. 
The most significant cases adopting this restrictive view are two 
1987 decisions, delivered the same day, concerning conscientious 
objection to military service.125 This right is explicitly recognized by 
the Constitution, although its precise regulation is left in the hands 
of the legislature.126 Until 1984, no statute was enacted to develop 
 
 121. See STC 15/1982, Apr. 23, 1982, FJ 6 (author’s translation). 
 122. For a brief explanation of this concept, see supra Part I. 
 123. See Rafael Navarro-Valls, La objeción de conciencia al aborto: derecho comparado y 
derecho español [Conscientious Objection to Abortion: Comparative Law and Spanish Law], 2 
A.D.E.E. 257, 298–303 (1986). 
 124. STC 53/1985, Apr. 11, 1985, FJ 14 (author’s translation). 
 125. STC 160/1987, Oct. 27, 1987 and STC 161/1987, Oct. 27, 1987. 
 126. Article 30(2) of the Constitution provides: “The law shall determine the military 
obligations of Spaniards and shall regulate, with the proper safeguards, conscientious objection 
as well as other grounds of exemption from compulsory military service; it may also, when ap-
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this constitutional provision. In that year, the legislature (Cortes Gen-
erales) passed two statutes to regulate the procedure that a citizen 
should follow to be legally recognized as a conscientious objector 
and the conditions for performing alternative civil service instead.127 
The Constitutional Court has ruled on this controversial subject sev-
eral times prior to and since the 1984 statutes.128 
The two decisions of 1987 responded, respectively, to a motion 
of unconstitutionality presented by the Spanish Ombudsman (Defen-
sor del Pueblo)129 and four questions of unconstitutionality posed by a 
central court (Audiencia Nacional) against different provisions of the 
1984 statutes.130 In both cases, the Constitutional Court rejected all 
the claims and sustained the entire content of the two statutes as 
constitutional.131 
Beyond the holdings directly related to the 1984 statutes on ob-
jection to military service,132 the most significant aspect of the 1987 
 
propriate, impose a form of social service in lieu thereof” (translated in SPANISH LEGISLATION, 
supra note 4, at 31). 
 127. The legislation enacted in 1984 experienced subsequent modifications. See 
NAVARRO-VALLS & MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 120, at 65–79. The most significant 
change in recent years has been the enactment of a new statute on conscientious objection to 
military service and substitutive civil service: Law 22/1998, July 6, 1998. 
 128. Cases decided through 1991 are cited and studied by RODRÍGUEZ CHACÓN, supra 
note 1, at 116–26. In post-1991 decisions in which the plaintiffs refused to perform substitu-
tive civil service upon grounds of conscience, the Court consistently has refused to recognize 
the plaintiff’s right to be exempted from such service. See STC 321/1994, Nov. 28, 1994; 
STC 55/1996, Mar. 28, 1996; STC 88/1996, May 23, 1996. 
 129. See STC 160/1987, Oct. 27, 1987. On the role played by the Spanish Ombudsman 
with respect to the protection of religious freedom, see Beatriz González Moreno, El defensor 
del pueblo y la defensa constitucional del derecho de libertad religiosa, ideológica y de culto [The 
Omsbudsman and the Constitutional Defense of the Right to Freedom of Religion, Ideology and 
Worship], in FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE, supra note 1, at 509. 
 130. See STC 161/1987, Oct. 27, 1987. 
 131. The main issues were: 1) the fact that the sincerity of the beliefs alleged by an objec-
tor could be investigated (which never happened in practice); 2) the fact that the right to con-
scientious objection could not be exercised after a person had been summoned; 3) some differ-
ences between the conditions in which the military service and the civil service were performed, 
including the fact that the civil service lasted a longer time (these differences have been elimi-
nated in the most recent legislation). 
 132. I will not go into the details of these decisions for two reasons. First, the lax applica-
tion of the 1984 laws has determined that conscientious objection to military service is not a 
real issue of freedom of conscience anymore in Spain; what happens in practice is that Spanish 
male citizens must perform a State service, and they freely choose, through a simple adminis-
trative procedure, whether they prefer a military service or a civil service. Second, the Spanish 
government has opted for a professional army, and the compulsory military service will be ex-
tinct in 2001. 
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decisions is the restrictive concept of freedom of conscience em-
ployed by the Court in contradiction with applicable precedent.133 
Specifically, the Constitutional Court affirmed drastically that to rec-
ognize a general right to conscientious objection was unthinkable, 
for it “would imply denying the very idea of State.” “What can oc-
cur,” the Court continued, “is that [conscientious objection] is ex-
ceptionally admitted with regard to a particular duty.”134 Without 
specific statutory support, the Court stated that the right to be ex-
empted from a legal obligation on account of one’s beliefs cannot be 
exercised even under the umbrella of freedom of conscience.135 In 
sum, the Court tried to break the obvious link existing between con-
scientious objection to military service and freedom of religion and 
belief, probably for fear of opening the way to an uncontrolled 
spread of conscientious objection to legal duties—a sort of “legal big 
bang.”136 
The obvious contradiction between this restrictive view of free-
dom of conscience and the expansive view of the same right in its 
1982 and 1985 decisions moved the Court to make some perplexing 
theoretical distinctions in an effort to validate its newly adopted 
view. For example, the Court classified conscientious objection to 
military service as “a constitutional right which is autonomous but 
not fundamental.”137 As evidence of the confusion and different 
views reigning in the Court, the same justice who wrote the decision 
for the Court also asserted, in a dissenting opinion, that conscien-
tious objection was a “fundamental right” derived from freedom of 
ideology and included in freedom of conscience or at least “in close 
and necessary in connection with” it.138 
In any event, the Court’s restrictive approach to rights of con-
science has arisen in other decisions and seems to have become the 
dominant approach to such issues. 
 
 
 133. See NAVARRO-VALLS & MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 120, at 20–24. 
 134. STC 161/1987, Oct. 27, 1987, FJ 3 (author’s translation). 
 135. See STC 160/1987, Oct. 27, 1987, FJ 3. It must be noted that the strong wording 
of the Court was likely caused by the fact that it was dealing with conscientious objection 
against a constitutional obligation—military service is mentioned in Article 30(1) of the Con-
stitution as a “right and duty” of citizens—and not just against an obligation derived from an 
ordinary statute. 
 136. See NAVARRO-VALLS & MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 120, at 243. 
 137. STC 160/1987, FJ 3. 
 138. See id. at FJ 3 n.1 (de la Vega Benayas, J., dissenting). 
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As early as 1985 this limited view of freedom of conscience can 
be found in a judgment on a case regarding Sabbath observance.139 A 
woman who had converted to the Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
was dismissed from her job when she refused to continue working on 
Saturdays. She proposed to the company different ways to resolve 
her conflict, but the company accepted none of her suggestions. The 
Court decided in favor of the employer, focusing its reasoning exclu-
sively on the fact that Sundays currently have the secular character of 
a holiday in Western societies. The Court did not even discuss the 
possibility that the employer should search for a reasonable accom-
modation of employees’ religious duties. 
A similar view dominates the Court’s reasoning in other two 
cases. In 1990, the Court rejected an alleged right to fiscal conscien-
tious objection where the plaintiff demanded to be exempted from 
the payment of a percentage of his income tax in proportion to the 
part of the state budget destined to military expenses.140 Similarly, in 
1996, the Court denied that a Jehovah’s Witness possessed the right 
to receive reimbursement from the state for medical expenses derived 
from his conscientious objection to blood transfusions—the plaintiff 
needed abdominal surgery and went to a private clinic because the 
surgeons of the public hospital refused to operate without perform-
ing a transfusion.141 
The Court’s continued adherence to such a restrictive interpreta-
tion of religious freedom suffers from two significant flaws. First, the 
Court’s reasoning has been very inconsistent. Second, as indicated 
above, the Court has ignored its own precedents on conscientious 
objection cases as well as its previously established general doctrine 
of an expansive interpretation of freedom of religion and conscience. 
It would have been more logical for the Court to recognize the right 
to act according to one’s conscience and then to examine whether 
that right may—or must—be restricted by the presence of a preva-
lent legal interest. 
 
 139. STC 19/1985, Feb. 13, 1985. For a critical analysis of this decision in the light of 
the Constitutional Court’s case law on freedom of conscience, see Adoración Castro Jover, La 
libertad de conciencia y la objeción de conciencia individual en la jurisprudencia constitucional 
española [Freedom of Conscience and Individual Objection of Conscience in Spanish Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence], in FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE, supra note 1, at 133, 
167–72. 
 140. See Providencia of June 28, 1990 (unpublished). 
 141. See STC 166/1996, Oct. 28, 1996. Note the interesting dissenting opinion by Jus-
tice Julio González Campos. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has outlined the most significant case law of the 
Spanish Constitutional Court on religion issues. It has approached 
this case law from two perspectives: the basic legal status of churches 
and the level of protection that individual freedom of conscience en-
joys in Spain. 
It would be beyond the scope of this article to discuss the policy 
of the Spanish government and legislature towards the principles of 
equality and neutrality, though some expressions of that policy are 
troubling. One example is the government’s apparent intention not 
to reach—in the near future—new formal agreements with other 
churches of wide implantation in Spain, like the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Another example 
is that duly registered religious denominations are far from obtaining 
the same legal privileges granted to those churches which have 
reached an agreement with the state (e.g., tax exemptions for reli-
gious property and activities, or civil effects to the religious ceremony 
of marriage). 
These two examples show that the application of the principles of 
equality and neutrality in Spanish law could be improved with regard 
to the legal treatment of minority religious groups. The same can be 
said regarding the doctrine of the Constitutional Court, especially in 
connection with the legal position of the Catholic Church. There are 
some historical privileges that are not strictly unconstitutional but 
seem more appropriate for a confessional state than for a neutral 
state. The clearest example is probably the system of teaching Catho-
lic religion in public schools as it is established in the 1979 Concor-
dat. 
By and large, the attitude of the Spanish Constitutional Court 
does not differ much from the one adopted by the European Court 
of Human Rights. Both courts tend to respect the traditional privi-
leges of majority churches so long as there are no flagrant violations 
of the individuals’ freedom of conscience nor of the principle of 
equality (nor also, in the case of the Spanish Constitutional Court, of 
state neutrality). 
The concordance with the European Court extends likewise to 
something that, in my view, constitutes the most negative aspect of 
the case law of our Constitutional Court: the fact that a theoretical 
expansive interpretation of freedom of conscience is often impaired 
in practice by a quasi-automatic predominance of “neutral” laws. 
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When these laws, which do not have a religious (or anti-religious) 
content or purpose, collide with the moral tenets of some citizens or 
religious groups, the state is under no obligation to accommodate 
the particular beliefs of these individuals or groups. Nor has it any 
obligation to provide evidence that restriction of religious freedom is 
necessary to attain the aim pursued by the neutral law.142 
There is apparently an implicit fear of conscience in the attitude 
of the Spanish and European courts, as if they were afraid that an at-
omization, or—a pulverization, of the established legal order would 
occur if every single claim of conscience were taken seriously. They 
lose sight of the fact that every human being has the right to live ac-
cording to his or her conscience, as long as other superior interests 
are not in danger. I am not arguing that individual conscience must 
be entrenched as an absolute value. Conscience is not, and cannot 
be, an absolute. It may be and must be constrained when conflicts 
with overriding legal interests arise. However, restrictions on free-
dom are legitimate only when they are necessary. Hence, the crucial 
issue is recognizing that the state has the burden of proving that, in a 
particular case, there is a predominant interest to which freedom of 
conscience must yield. This is a way to avoid possible abuses or 
veiled discriminations. 
To deny, or severely reduce, the rights of individual conscience is 
a grave mistake. A secular state should not be afraid of freedom of 
conscience, nor of free individual consciences that take morals seri-
ously. They should fear fundamentalism: religious fundamentalism as 
well as secular fundamentalism.143 Both are expressions of intoler-
ance, which is incompatible with pluralism. And pluralism—the op-
portunity to express plural ideas in speech, writing, or behavior—is 
not only the essence of democracy; it is, above all, the natural result 
of freedom, which is the essence of human nature. 
 
 142. For an analysis of this aspect of the case law of the European Court and further bib-
liographical references on the topic, see Javier Martínez-Torrón & Rafael Navarro-Valls, The 
Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the European Convention on Human Rights, 9:3 
HELSINKI MONITOR 25, 30–34 (1998). 
 143. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has approved two significant 
recommendations in this regard: Recommendation 1202 (1993) on religious tolerance in a 
democratic society and Recommendation 1396 (1999) on religion and democracy. In them, 
the Assembly warns against extremism, which is defined as a “perversion of religion.” 
